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Abstract : This paper analyzes the household decision-making process leading to the 
allocation of time and consumption in the family. We estimate, on the British Household 
Panel Survey, a collective model of demand for leisure generalized to the production of a 
household public good. For the first time in such a framework the sharing rule conditional on 
public expenditures is identified by woman's change of family status: from single-living to 
couple or from couple to single-living. Welfare implications are elaborated. Woman's share 
of household's private expenditures appears to be on average 45\%. 
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Résumé : Ce papier étudie le processus de décision intra-familial conduisant à une allocation 
du temps et de la consommation entre les différents membres du ménage. J’estime, sur le 
British Household Panel Survey, un modèle collectif de demande de loisir généralisé à la 
production d’un bien domestique public. Pour la première fois dans ce type de modèle, la 
règle de partage conditionnelle aux dépenses publiques est identifiée en utilisant le 
changement de statut familial  des femmes: formation d’un couple ou séparation. Des 
implications en terme de bien-être sont élaborées. La part de la femme dans les dépenses 
privées du ménage avoisine en moyenne les 45%. 
 
Mots-clés: Production domestique, Bien public, Model collectif, Règle de partage. 
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1. Introduction
Female labor supply behavior is known to be more ﬂexible than male’s one and highly
correlated to their family status. In the United Kingdom, as in all the European countries,
we observe that women in couple or with children tend to work fewer hours on the labor
market, and they also experience lower participation rates.
Our ﬁrst concern is to explain the impact of family status on female labor supply. In
the literature, it is often argued that women are the main time contributor to domestic
production, because of their comparative advantage (Becker, 1981). The specialization of
roles in the family makes women substitute market work against non market household
activities. Women in couple thus supply fewer hours of market work and experience higher
inactivity rates. Furthermore, the presence of a partner in itself has an impact on the
diﬀerence of behavior between women in couple and single-living women. Theoretically, the
household utility function is diﬀerent for women single-living and for couples, the change in
household preferences, due to the change of state is thus obvious.
Our second concern is to be able to compare the behavior of economic agents that are
fundamentally diﬀerent: an individual and a household composed of two individuals. Most
of the time, economic outcomes are measured at the household level, the speciﬁc situation
∗This research beneﬁted from a Marie Curie program. The BHPS was made available through the Data
Archive, Essex University. Aknowledgments: I would like to thank John Ermisch, Mette Erjnaes, Martin
Browning, Bo Honoré, Nicolas Gravel for stimulating research comments. All remaining errors are mine.of each member of the household (in terms of preferences or consumption) being ignored. In
the better case, households are compared using traditional equivalence scales, the relative
weight of each member in the household’s aggregate utility function is considered as equal
and intra-household inequality issues ignored. One stake of this paper is to recover females’
speciﬁc welfare in the household, in order to implement welfare comparisons between women
of diﬀerent family status. Household production activities, mainly carried out by women,
clearly bring an additional welfare to all family members. But household production is also
made at some cost, as it implies to forego a certain amount of leisure and a part or the totality
of an income from market work. More than recovering the speciﬁc individual situation of
women inside the family, we can analyze how women who specialize in household production
activities are compensated in terms of welfare by the intra-household income/time allocation
process.
Such an allocation process is analyzed in a collective framework. This means that we view
the family as a political place, characterized by conﬂicts of interest, but also cooperation and
share. As emphasized by Chiappori (1988), Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992), Browning
and Chiappori (1998), the family decision making process cannot be represented by a unique
utility function. Each family member is an economic agent, endowed with preferences. We
assume that the family decision is the outcome of a cooperative bargaining process between
its members. This implies that the household outcome is Pareto-eﬃcient. The collective
framework has the advantage of encompassing both the unitary model and other bargaining
approaches such as Nash-bargaining models (Horney and McElroy (1981), Manser and Brown
(1980)). As we do not have to specify a threat point, the collective model is more ﬂexible in
its empirical implementation. It is also more realistic as it does not imply the symmetry of
family members substitution eﬀects or the income pooling property.
In this framework, individuals can substitute market work against non market work
activities, which we view as domestic production. A public domestic good is produced
with time inputs of family members. We implement an estimate of a collective model of
demand for leisure conditional on this public good consumption. In recent contributions,
Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997) discuss the incorporation of an assignable private
domestic good in a collective model of labor supply, and Aronsson and Al. (2001) provide
an implementation on Swedish data. In our approach, the domestic good is modelled as a
public good. We believe that this is a better way to interpret housework activities, which
2consumption can hardly be assigned between household’s members and even more hardly
sold on the market.
An income sharing rule, which represents the underlying intra-family negotiation process,
is recovered from the collective model. On this basis, intra-household inequality implications
can be elaborated. Unfortunately, data usually do not contain both time use and consump-
tion informations, the household demand system is imperfectly observed and the sharing
rule can only be recovered from the model in relative terms : we can estimate its derivatives
with respect to prices, income and distribution factors, but not the constant of the shar-
ing rule. This considerably limits possible interpretations of the collective model in terms
of inequality. One of the innovations of this paper is to identify the sharing rule by using
the change of family status from single-living to couple or from living-in-couple to single.
Intra-household welfare analysis is based on the share of leisure time as an assignable and
observable good.
The outline of the paper is the following : section 2 develops the theoretical model, then
we describe the econometric speciﬁcation in section 3, section 4 describes the results and
section 5 concludes.
2. A theoretical model of allocation of time in the family
A family is composed of two decision-makers, namely spouses, with or without dependent
children. There is no other decision-maker in the family, children have no bargaining power.
Each individual is characterized by his/her own preference ordering over consumption and
leisure. Two types of good can be consumed : an aggregate consumption good C and a public
domestic good D. In the following, we denote by the superscript s the female’s partner
variables. Individual total time T can be allocated to the production of the domestic good t,
sold on the labor market H, or directly consumed as leisure L. The hourly wage is denoted
by w whereas y is non-labor income.
The allocation of time within the family is modeled with a collective model of labor
supply, extended to household production. The household good is taken as public and the
collective model of leisure demand is formalized given a predetermined choice of household
production.
A recent paper from Chiappori and Al. (2002) deals with the introduction of a public
3good in a collective model of labor supply, in an unconditional way. The authors show that
if preferences are separable regarding the public good then the sharing rule conditional on
public expenditures can be recovered up to a constant. This framework as two limitations.
First, it is required to make a separability assumption on preferences. Second, the existence
of the conditional sharing rule does not guarantee the eﬃciency of public expenditures. In
empirical applications, the eﬃciency of household production has to be assumed.
In this paper, an unobserved public domestic good is produced with time spent at house-
work. An unconditional approach would require to parametrize a domestic production func-
tion and to make eﬃciency assumptions about the allocation of time inputs. Moreover, the
constant of the sharing rule would not be identiﬁed on the basis of single-living women pref-
erences because we clearly face an identiﬁcation problem for single-living women. If we set
the price of the domestic good to the opportunity cost of time, then it is not possible to dis-
entangle the choice of leisure and domestic good consumption in single-living women utility
function. Of course, the conditional approach is limited by its own deﬁnition: it gives con-
ditional results. Welfare comparison will be elaborated conditionally on the domestic good
consumption. The conditional approach gives us a good interpretation of woman’s share
of household’s private expenditures. However, we must keep in mind that the eﬃciency of
the conditional model does not imply the eﬃciency of the full unconditional model and vice
versa.
2.1. Domestic production
A domestic good is produced with time inputs from the woman (t) and her partner (ts).
In Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997), the domestic good consumption is private
and assignable, household members can exchange a part of the domestic good at a particular
price decided between household’s members. This is typically the case of housework activities
such as cooking or washing someone’s garments, these private outcomes can also be bought
on the market, in this case, the price in the household is also the market one. We believe
that this approach is not a realistic way to model the domestic good. Family life involves a
high degree of sharing and most of the household production can be seen as public. This is
particularly the case of cleaning or child bearing activities. In the framework proposed here,
the consumption of the domestic good by one member does not aﬀect its consumption by
the other members.
4Our main concern for the continuation of this work is to be able to compare, in the same
framework, single-living women and women in-couple. Both can produce a domestic good,






where h1 and h2 are increasing functions of t and ts.
Aronsson and Al. (2001) model the household production assuming a CES technology,
and implement some estimates assuming an eﬃcient allocation of inputs. The results show
a complementarity of time inputs to household production1.I ti st h u sd i ﬃ c u l tt os u p p o r t
t h ei d e at h a tad o m e s t i cg o o dc a nb ep r o d u c e db yas i n g l e - l i v i n gi n d i v i d u a lw i t ht h es a m e
technology than a couple. There must exist some mechanisms implying that the domestic
production function is diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of household: h1(t)  = h2(t,0).I n t h i s
latter case, it is not possible to estimate a quantity of domestic good for single individuals
without any parametric assumption on the domestic good production function. But, we do
not have any idea about the eventual economies of scales. For all these reasons, we keep
an unrestricted version of the domestic good production technology. The allocation can be
eﬃcient or not, and we do not restrict the shape of the production function.
We assume that the domestic good production is determined in a ﬁrst step, the quantity
of domestic good is not observed but we observe time inputs to household production t,ts
and public expenditures: wt for single women and wt+ wsts for couples.
2.2. A conditional collective model of leisure demand for couples
The domestic production decision is predetermined, whereas pure leisure and consumption
are eﬃciently assigned between spouses, given public expenditures. Private expenditures   FI
are represented by the sum of earnings potentials and non labor incomes of each spouse (full
income) minus expenditures involved in the production of the domestic good. The resources
of the household in the second step are the following:
  FIh = FI
h − wt− w
st
s with FI
h = wT + w
sT + y + y
s (2.2)
1Author’s estimates on the BHPS also show a weak substitution elastictity of 0.05.
5The cooperative allocation of consumption C,Cs and leisure L,Ls, given the conditional
budget of the household is solution of the following program (P):





C + Cs + wL+ wsLs ≤   FIh
  T = L + H
  T s = Ls + Hs
with   FIh = FIh − wt− wsts ,   T = T − t and   T s = T − ts
(P)
Assuming cardinal preferences and usual regularity assumptions on the shape of the utility
functions, µ(.) situates the outcome on a precise point of the eﬃcient frontier. In general,
µ can be a function of prices, incomes, individual heterogeneity or even distribution factors.
If µ does not depend on prices or income, then the model collapses to the unitary one.
As in the second welfare theorem, we can decentralize the solution of the program. There
exists a distribution of income:   FIh = φ+φ
s such that the solution of (P) is also the solution
of each member’s maximization program, given the allocation of income. Thus, program (P)
is equivalent to the two programs deﬁned by (P’). The negotiation takes place as if individuals
were to maximize their own utility subject to a share of   FIh, this share being negotiated
between spouses in a preliminary step:
MaxCi,Li ui(Ci,L i;D)
st. Ci + wiLi = φ
i
st.   T i ≥ Li i = s if woman’s partner
(P’)
  T i = T −ti is the remaining disposable time, household private expenditures   FIh are shared
between spouses, such that φ+φ
s =   FIh.φrepresents female total expenditures in consump-
tion good and pure leisure, whereas φ
s represents male total expenditures in consumption
good and pure leisure. The income sharing rule is a reduced form of the negotiation process
and depends on the same arguments as µ: prices, incomes, individual heterogeneity in pref-
erences and distribution factors. This sharing rule is conditional on the ﬁrst step decision
of domestic good consumption. Given φ, the demand functions for consumption and leisure
have the usual properties of Marshallian demands. Normalizing the price of the market good
















6The observation of leisure demand is suﬃcient to recover the derivatives of the conditional
sharing rule, depending on wages w, ws,i n c o m e sy, ys, distribution factors s and other
preference parameters (See Chiappori, 1992 and Chiappori, Fortin, Lacroix, 2001, for details
on the derivation of the sharing rule, with and without distribution factors).
φ = φ(wf,w m,y,y
s,s;preference parameters : z,D) (2.4)
In principle, the sharing rule (2.4) can be used as a tool to analyze intra-household inequality
issues. One of the main drawback of this sharing rule is that it can only be recovered up to a
constant (See Chiappori, 1992 for a proof). The absolute distribution of income in the family
remains unknown. In this paper, we propose to use single-living women behavior to identify
the constant of the sharing rule. Then, the implementation of some welfare comparisons
becomes possible.
2.3. Identiﬁcation of the sharing rule
The knowledge of the distribution of income in the family would give the collective model
a higher explanatory power to analyze intra-household inequality issues. We propose to use
single-living women to identify the absolute intra-family distribution of income. The basic
idea is the following: single-living women do not have to bargain with a partner, they can
spend 100% of their own full income. If we observed a woman single-living and a woman
living in a couple having the same preferences, then the change in leisure demand between
family status would allow us to approximate the share of income. Figure 1 illustrates this
purpose. It represents the Engel curve of demand for leisure of the same woman observed in
two diﬀerent states, the demand functions are the following:
Lsingle = L(w,FI;D) (2.5)
Lcouple = L(w,φ;D)
The marginal eﬀect of income on leisure demand β is identiﬁed by observing the behavior
of the woman when she lives single. In the linear case, we have the following relation between
leisure consumption and incomes:
Lcouple − Lsingle = β(φ − FI) (2.6)





The empirical implementation implies to parametrize preference parameters and the shar-
ing rule. Moreover, women are not observed at the same time single-living and living-in-
a-couple. For each individual, we allow for change in preferences between the two states
coming from a change in the explanatory variables such as the hourly wage rate. Of course,
a selection bias can occur if single-living women have diﬀerent unobserved characteristics
than women in-couple. We control for the selection bias by using a panel data ﬁxed eﬀect
estimator. The sharing rule in itself will be identiﬁed only on the sub-sample of individuals
who experience a switch from single-to-couple or from couple-to-single.
3. An empirical implementation on the BHPS
3.1. Data
The British Household Panel Survey contains a full set of informations about households and
their members from 1992 to 2000. Not only labor supply behavior is reported (usual weekly
hours of paid work, labor earnings, non labor earnings), but also time-use informations
s u c ha st h et i m es p e n to nh o u s e w o r ka c t i v i t i e sd u r i n gt h ew e e k .E v e ni fs u c haq u e s t i o ni s
subjective, we hope it gives a realistic approximation of the real share of time allocated to
produce the domestic good. We are aware that the information is probably less reliable than
in an objective time-use survey. This being so, we do not have to venture into a merge of
two diﬀerent data sources.
Table 1 describes the sub-sampling selection rule. First, we isolate women single living or
living in a couple, withdrawing all particular families such as collocation or people living with
one of their parents. This step is necessary for the data to ﬁt into the collective framework
speciﬁed. Then, to make sure that the demand for leisure analysis does not capture other
eﬀects such as human capital investments or rationing on the labor market, we exclude
students and involuntary unemployed people. This will constitute what we call the full
sample of 18022 observations, used to implement the ﬁxed eﬀect panel data estimate. Some
descriptive statistics of the full-sample are reported in table 2. We can notice that 80% of
the couples are married and 50% have children, around 40% of the single-living women are
8lone-mothers. Time spent at housework by men is particularly low compared to women’s:
5.7 hours a week for men against 16.6 for women. Finally, we extract from the full sample
a restricted sample of 2201 observations corresponding to 420 individuals who experienced
at least one change in their family status. This restricted sample is used when the selection
bias due to household formation is not controlled, which is the case when we predict indirect
utility levels.
For the empirical analysis, the hourly wage is calculated by dividing the usual net monthly
wage by the usual hours of work per month (including overtime). Non-working individuals
are kept in the sample, corresponding missing hourly wages are imputed on the basis of
demographics, educational achievement, regional and year dummies.
3.2. Speciﬁcation
3.2.1. Preferences and demand for leisure
Demands for consumption and leisure correspond to a Linear Expenditure System (LES).
Women, either living in couple or not face the following cost function :
c(w,u)=γ + wα + uw
β (3.1)
The corresponding indirect utility function is :
V (w,   FI)=w−β
 
  FI− γ − wα
 
for single-living women
V (w,   FI)=w−β (φ − γ − wα) for women in couple
(3.2)
A n dd e m a n df o rl e i s u r e:










for women in couple
(3.3)
  FI and φ are private expenditures on pure leisure and the consumption good respectively
for women single-living and in-couple, whereas φ is the share of income obtained by a woman
in a couple, conditional on household’s public expenditures. The subsistence level of leisure
is denoted by α, whereas γ stands for the subsistence level of consumption. The demand for
the consumption good is not modelled explicitly: income that is not spent on leisure will be
consumed as an aggregate consumption good.
93.2.2. Dependency with domestic good consumption
Private goods consumption is modelled conditional on a predetermined consumption of public
good. We propose three diﬀerent estimations of the model.
Model 1 We implement an estimate of the demand for leisure function assuming that
preferences are separable with respect to the public good:
U(C,L,D)=F [u(C,L),D] (3.4)
In this case, the domestic good consumption that takes place in a ﬁrst step has an impact
on the second step demand for leisure only via an income eﬀect, by reducing the budget for
private expenditures. For single women, total private expenditures   FI will correspond to the
individual’s full income minus domestic good expenditures. The domestic good consumption
is perfectly observed in our data and corresponds to the opportunity cost of time spent at
housework. The share of income allocated to women in couple own private consumption φ will
be conditional on the total household public expenditures. As emphasized by Chiappori and
Al. (2002) in the collective framework, one sharing rule of the household private expenditures
can correspond to several household public expenditures and vice-versa, the sharing rule is
conditional on household public expenditures:
φ(PUBEXP) with PUBEXP = wt+ w
st
s (3.5)
Model 2 A major problem of this speciﬁcation is that in practice, households’ consump-
tion choices of the domestic good and leisure are simultaneous. The sequential assumption
can generate some endogeneity that we will have to control for. Private expenditures will
closely depend on the domestic good production choice which is simultaneously chosen with
the demand for leisure. The endogeneity of private expenditures will be controlled with in-
strumental variables that should reﬂect the total income, the price of the domestic good and
the chosen consumption of domestic good. Model 2 controls for this endogeneity. The in-
struments are the individual full income, the individual full income squared and the presence
of a dish-washer in the household.
Model 3 We relax the assumption of separability of the utility function with respect to the
domestic good. The sub-utility from consumption and leisure will depend on the quantity
10of domestic good consumed u(C,L;D). Leisure and domestic good consumption can be
substitutable, complementary or independent goods.
The parameters of the linear expenditure system will depend on the quantity of domestic
good. Following Browning and Meghir (1991)’s way of conditioning preferences, we write:
c(w,u;D)=γ + wα(D)+uw
β (3.6)
The quantity of domestic good D is not observed in the data. To avoid any restriction
about the domestic good production function, we specify the dependency in an unrestricted
way (equation 2.1). Taking into account the fact that the production technology can diﬀer
between singles and couples, we allow α1  = α2:
c(w,u;D)=γ + wα1(t)+uwβ for single-living women
c(w,u;D)=γ + wα2(t,ts)+uwβ for women in couple
(3.7)
Moreover, as the sharing rule depends on preferences for the domestic good, we have to




As in model 1, the decision of time allocation to housework and leisure consumption is
simultaneous and a lot of variables of this speciﬁcation are suspected to be endogenous, in
particular   FI,PUBEXP,tand ts.
3.3. Panel data identiﬁcation of preferences and of the sharing rule
L e tu sd e n o t eb yδit =1if a woman from household i is in couple at time t, δit =0if not.
In the LES speciﬁcation of preferences (3.3), we assume that the subsistence level of leisure
α can vary with individual heterogeneity, whereas the subsistence level of consumption γ
remains constant. Leisure demand for women, in a couple or not, can be written:
Lit = αit(1 − β) − γβw
−1
it + β






Each individual requires a ﬁxed minimum level of leisure ai, plus a term dependent on k
observed explanative time-varying variables Xit. Explanative variables are marital status,
presence of a child, number of children and age of youngest child. The ﬁxed eﬀect captures
11unobserved heterogeneity in preferences between women. It also controls for any systematic
selection bias between women in couple and single-living women. Preferences for leisure can
diﬀer between a woman who is always in couple and a woman who is always single-living.
Whatever the correlation between family status and preferences for leisure, this correlation
should not matter for the consistency of the estimator as soon as it remains ﬁxed for each
individual within the time period analyzed. This assumption appears reasonable with re-
spect to the gain in precision we can beneﬁt by using the full sample (18000 observations).
Preferences can depend on the quantity of the domestic good consumed in the household
in an unrestricted way. The unknown domestic production functions h1 and h2 depend on
the time spent at housework and they are linearly approximated. In model 1 and 2, the
separability of preferences with respect to the domestic good imposes that c1 = c2 =0 .
αit = ai + bXit + c1δith1(tit)+c2(1 − δit)h2(tit,t
s
it) (3.10)
The sharing rule φit corresponds to woman’s expenditures on leisure and consumption good.
Only the expenditures on leisure are observed. Private expenditures are recovered via the
following parametrization of the share of income:
φit = r0 + r1wit + r2w
s
it + r3yit + r4y
s
it + r5Xit + r6PUBEXP + r7h2(tit,t
s
it) (3.11)
φit depends on prices, incomes and preference parameters. It is also conditional on household
public expenditures, taken as endogenous in model 2. If the quantity of domestic good
changes the taste for leisure (model 3), then it should also play a role on the negotiation
process and on the income sharing rule. The last term reﬂects this dependency. In the
separability case (model 1 and 2), r7 =0 .
Substituting the sharing rule (3.11) and preference parameters (3.10) in the leisure de-
mand equation (3.9) gives the following panel data equation:























wit + µt + εit
(3.12)
µt is a time component, ﬁxed between individuals. It is introduced to capture any macro-
economics eﬀects on the leisure time that is not linked to preferences or to intra-household
negotiation. A signiﬁcative coeﬃcient can be due to a change in the average working time,
to the composition of the labor force, or even to changes in involuntary unemployment rate.
12The white noise εit should control for measurement errors and any remaining time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity on the sharing rule and on the preferences. We estimate equation
(3.12) by a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator on the full sample. This choice is mainly driven by two
elements:
- ﬁrst, it is highly probable that the ﬁxed eﬀect µi is correlated with the explanatory
variables. Contrary to the random eﬀect estimator, the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator may capture
unobserved heterogeneity related to preferences, even if these unobserved characteristics are
correlated with explanative variables. In particular, it can be the case that the household
formation is correlated with unobserved characteristics2.
- second, the within aspect of the data is fundamental to identify the sharing rule. It is
clear, in equation (3.12) that, given a consistent estimate of β,the r parameters are identiﬁed
with the time-change of family status δ of the individual i. δ varies between 0 and 1 for
420 individuals switchers in the data. A ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimator would directly take into
account a change from one period to another, whereas the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator compares
the present situation with the average family situation of the individual. An adjustment of
the leisure time is susceptible to occur just before and just after the change of family status,
and not only at the precise point of the change. With the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator, we avoid
to capture only the mechanism happening around the switching point, choosing to represent
the average eﬀect of the switching process on leisure time.
A requirement of the model is that the shocks in leisure should be uncorrelated with all
past or future values of the explanative variables. This would not be the case if, for example,
t h ed e c i s i o nt od i v o r c ei sl i n k e dt oa ni n c o m es h o c kr e l a t e dt oac h a n g ei nw o r k i n gt i m e ,o ri f
the search process on the marriage market requires leisure time. In any case, the correlation
between δ and ε requires to endogeneise household formation or dissolution, this goes far
beyond the objective of this paper. We will assume the uncorrelation between δ and ε.
To control for endogeneity of singles’ private expenditures   FI and of couples’ public
expenditures PUBEXP in model 2, we implement a within 2SLS estimator, see Baltagi
(2001) for more details. Instruments must vary with time and be correlated with   FI and
PUBEXP, we use exogenous variables of the model, individual full income, individual
full income squared and utilization of a dish washer in the household. This last equipment
induces a signiﬁcant decrease in time spent at housework and thus in public expenditures. Of
2The random eﬀect estimator is rejected at usual level by Hausman’s test.
13course, to some extend, the choice of buying a dish washer is a voluntary way to increase the
productivity of the household’s production technology, this could be related to the preferences
for leisure, but there is no reason for this instrument to be strongly correlated with a shock
in leisure time.
Finally model 3 is estimated without taking into account the potential endogeneity of
public expenditures and domestic good consumption because this involved a lot of variables
in the model and we could not guarantee reasonable exclusion restrictions for each of them.
In particular, it is rather diﬃcult to ﬁnd correct instruments to predict the time each partner
spends at housework and the share of time in the family. Opinion variables, number of rooms
in the household and household composition instruments were not good enough to carry out
a correct convergence of the model.
4. Results
4.1. Demand for leisure
Table 3 shows random eﬀect estimates of the panel data equation (3.12). Results from model
1, 2 and 3 are presented, with standard errors and each parameter’s signiﬁcance level. The
overall R squared is around 15%, whereas the value, sign and signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients seems
globally robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Model 1 and 2 assume separability of preferences
with respect to the public good, and Hausman test rejects the within estimator against
the 2SLS within estimator (χ2(22) = 529.79). Given a correct speciﬁcation of the model,
private expenditures for singles and public expenditures for couples are endogenous variables.
Controlling for endogeneity, income elasticity of the demand for leisure appears lower and
similar to the unrestricted speciﬁcation of model 3: the coeﬃcient associated to (1−δ)  FI/W
decreases from 0.3 to 0.2. When conditioning preferences for leisure with respect to domestic
good consumption, it appears that the impact of the presence of a child is weaker both for
single-living women and for women in couple.
Table 4 presents the estimated coeﬃcients of the preference parameters (equations 3.6
and 3.10). Standard errors are calculated with the delta method. In the 3 speciﬁcations, the
subsistence level of consumption looks reasonable: between 83 and 120£1991 aw e e k .
The average of the ﬁxed level of leisure required by individuals is around 130 hours per
week. Family status does not seem to have a signiﬁcant impact of the subsistence level
14of leisure. On the contrary, the number and age of children have a strong impact in the
three models: the more children, the higher is the preference for leisure, this eﬀect is even
stronger if the youngest child is small. This result comes from the fact that a part of the
time allocated to children is not reported by individuals as time spent at housework, a part
o ft h et i m es p e n tw i t hc h i l d r e ni st h u ss e e na sl e i s u r eb yw o m e n .
The unrestricted speciﬁcation of model 3 gives similar results on preferences. Time spent
at housework by a woman single-living, or time spent at housework by a woman in couple or
her partner signiﬁcantly decreases the subsistence level of leisure required. As the domestic
good production technology is increasing with time spent at housework, it appears that the
impact of the domestic good on preferences for leisure is negative, both for single-living
women and for women in couple. As we do not have any measure of the quantity of the
domestic good produced, we are not directly interested in the eventual welfare implications
of the domestic good consumption in the household. However, we can take into account
the fact that the domestic good and leisure appear substitutable to each other: the more
domestic good is consumed, the lower the basic leisure requirement.
4.2. Sharing rule
Table 5 shows the estimated parameters of the sharing rule speciﬁed in equation (3.11).
Here again, there are very few diﬀerences between model 1, 2 and 3. The female’s wage
increases considerably her private expenditures, whereas her partner’s wage increases them
very slightly. This is due to a general increase in the household’s full income, but probably
not in the bargaining power. The eﬀect of non labor income is diﬀerent depending on who
gets the non-labor income: a higher non-labor income for females increases their bargaining
power in the family in model 2. The year of birth variable is aimed to capture a cohort
eﬀect. The signiﬁcance is weak. In model 1 and 2, the coeﬃcient appears to be slightly
negative. Younger generations tend to allocate a lower share of household’s private income
towards women’s expenditures. Surprisingly, the argument that younger generations would
b em o r ee q u a lt o w a r d sf e m a l e st h a no l d e rg e n e r a t i o n si sn o tv e r i ﬁ e di nt h i sd a t a .T h eg r e a t e r
equality that is suspected in younger couples could come from the general increase of female
hourly wages compared to males’, but is apparently not directly linked to a change in the
mentalities in itself. The preceding result is compensated by the trend coeﬃcient which
indicates that female’s share of income tends to increase with time spent with her partner.
15The impact of marital status and children is ambiguous. According to model 1 and 2,
w o m e nh a v eah i g h e rs h a r ei ft h e yh a v eac h i l d ,e s p e c i a l l yi ft h ec h i l di sy o u n ga n di ft h e
couple is not married. On the opposite, for model 3, married women with a child obtain a
signiﬁcantly higher share of household expenditures compared to women cohabiting. The
impact of motherhood is ambiguous according to models 1, 2 and 3. In all cases, mothers
experience a loss in their sharing rule when the younger child becomes older and when they
give birth to an additional child. Another interesting feature concerns marriage. Women
without child who get married tend to experience a diminishing share of household’s private
expenditures.
Public expenditures have a negative impact on the woman’s share of income. This is
directly due to the reduction in private household income to be shared between the woman
and her partner. When taking into account the impact of the domestic good consumption on
preferences (model 3), it appears that most of the coeﬃcients remain the same. The impact
of children becomes less signiﬁcant, a part of the time devoted to children is included in the
production of the household public good. Time spent at housework have a positive eﬀect on
the sharing rule. The eﬀect of time input to the domestic good as a concave shape as shown
in ﬁgure 2. As soon as the time spent to housework does not exceed the equivalent of a full
time job, the eﬀect on the sharing rule is positive. If the domestic good production increases
with time inputs, it appears that the quantity of domestic good consumed plays a positive
role on the sharing rule. This could be due to woman’s comparative advantage in household
production. As the opportunity cost of woman’s time is lower, or as their productivity at
housework is higher, the household gains if woman’s time is the main input to household
production. In this case, a part of this eﬃciency gain is redistributed towards women. If
the investment in the public good production is too high (the equivalent of a full time job),
then women can spend less in term of consumption and leisure.
Table 6 presents the average predicted female share of income conditional on the house-
hold’s consumption of domestic good . It appears for the 3 speciﬁcations that the conditional
share of income varies between 40% and 50% on average with a standard error around 10%.
These calculations are realized only on the sub-sample of switchers to avoid the selection
bias problem. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the sharing rule in the population. For
the three models, it looks symmetric and between 0 and 1.
In order to analyze the implications of intra-household wage inequality on the intra-
16household distribution of power, we draw in Figure 3 the average sharing rule for diﬀerent
ratios of wages between woman and her partner’s hourly wage. Some striking features
appear. First, the three speciﬁcations give very similar patterns for the evolution of the
average sharing rule. Then, we observe that intra-household equality would (on average)
take place if women’s hourly wages were not diﬀerent from their partner’s. This illustrates
the great importance of hourly wages on the sharing rule. The stake of the gender wage gap
seems to go far beyond usual socio-economics aspects, it has also a crucial impact on the
distribution of power inside the family.
4.3. Welfare implications of life in a couple
Table 7 provides the average marginal eﬀects of diﬀerent variables on welfare. The welfare is
measured by the sub-utility of leisure and consumption. It is conditional on the consumption
of the public good. It appears that an increase of the hourly wage increases the level of indi-
rect utility functions both for women in couple or single-living. An increase in the partner’s
wage increases slightly the welfare level of women in couple, because the full income to share
becomes higher. Time spent at housework approximates the production of a domestic good.
In the two ﬁrst models, it appears that an increase of time spent at housework by the woman
or her partner decreases the indirect utility from consumption and leisure. This is due to the
budget constraint: the more time one spends on the domestic good, the less one can spend
on leisure and consumption. If we allow preferences to change conditional on the quantity of
domestic good (model 3), it appears that time spent at housework increases the welfare of
women in couple. The negative budget constraint eﬀect is encompassed by the substitution
eﬀect between domestic good and other goods for single-living women. This positive impact
on welfare comes from an increase in woman’s bargaining power linked to a comparative
advantage in housework. Moreover the eﬃciency gain linked to the use of woman’s time as
the main input to household production is partly redistributed to the woman as a part of
household’s general welfare. This last result goes in the direction of the fact that women
who invest their time in household production are indeed compensated in term of welfare
by the household income allocation process. This is an average and does not apply to all
the women, some of them, as illustrated in Figure 3, are characterized by a particularly low
bargaining power. Moreover, according to Figure 2, if women completely specialize in house-
work, spending more than a full-time job in this activity, they are more likely to experience
17a loss of welfare. Of course, these results only reﬂect the welfare gain in terms of leisure or
market good consumption, they are weakened by the fact that the consumption of the ag-
gregate market good is not observed but inferred from the Linear Expenditure System. The
endogeneity of domestic production variables in model 3 is not taken into account. However,
the speciﬁcation looks robust as the coeﬃcients do not vary between the speciﬁcations in
m o d e l1 ,2a n d3 .
5. Conclusion
A collective demand for leisure is modeled for a sample of British women in couple or not,
observed on a maximum period of 9 years, from 1992 to 2000. A public domestic good can be
produced with time spent at housework by family members. Fixed eﬀect panel data estimates
are implemented on the BHPS with 3 diﬀerent speciﬁcations. 420 individuals who change
of family status from single-living to couple or from living-in-couple to single are used to
identify the income sharing rule and to predict the ratio of income allocated to the woman in
the family. Three diﬀerent speciﬁcations based on diﬀerent assumptions are implemented. In
model 1, preferences are assumed separable with respect to the domestic good, in model 2, we
control for the endogeneity of public expenditures. Finally, model 3 relaxes the separability
assumption. The coeﬃcients appear very similar between the speciﬁcations and the main
interpretations are basically the same. Conditional on the public good consumption, woman’s
average share of income is estimated to be between 40 and 50%, and is probably around 45%.
The predicted distribution of the sharing rule among the population is represented in Figure
3. Then, welfare comparisons are implemented with predictions of the conditional sub-utility
of leisure and consumption. The main results are the following:
• A part of the time devoted to children is experienced by women as leisure time, another
part of this time is considered as housework. Thus, the presence of a child does not
have a straight welfare implication here. However, given that a woman has a child, the
number of children clearly reduce woman’s share of income.
• The marital status has a clear negative impact on woman’s welfare if they do not have
a child. This situation can improve with time as the share increases with time spent
with the same partner.
18• As illustrated in Figure 4, the sharing rule is highly driven by the intra-household
share of hourly wages, it would be on average equal if the hourly wages were equal,
this emphasize the stake of reducing the gender wage gap to reduce intra-household
inequality.
• The young generation does not seem to experience a change of mentality towards
greater equality between men and women in the family. The cohort eﬀect is weak and
even slightly negative. The change in the distribution of power between generations
can come from other factors such as the evolution of females’ wages relative to males’.
• Finally, we evidenced in model 3 that the production of the domestic good, which is
largely due to woman’s time contribution, has a positive welfare impact as soon as the
woman does not spend more than a full time job at housework. Women can thus ﬁnd
a greater welfare compensation in family relationships.
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Table 1: Selection of the Sub-sample 
 
 





Women from 20 to 65 year old from 1992 to 2000  15257  25243  40500 
- No other person (except children) in the household  5957  19110  25067 
- Non Student, Not Involuntary Unemployed  5645  17791  23436 
- Full Sample: No missing values  
(Housework, hours of work, wage and income)  
5103 12919  18022 
- Restricted Sample: The individual change from couple to 
single or from single to couple 
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In Employment  56.58 %  71.61 %  84.53 % 
If in work, usual weekly hours of work declared 









































Child  40.96 %  51.84 %  51.84 % 


















Married Couple    80.59 %  80.59 % 
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Table 3: Leisure Demand, fixed effect estimator 
 
 Model  1  Std   Model  2  Std   Model  3  Std   
Constant    86.84  1.885  *** -  113.2  29.16  ***    114.3  2.005  *** 
Married with child    2.578  1.201  **    3.111  1.779  *    0.832  1.117  NS 
Married without child    1.576  1.058  NS    2.896  1.409  **    0.898  0.987  NS 
Cohabiting with child  - 1.773  1.101  NS -  2.082  1.779  NS    1.509  1.033  NS 
Age of youngest child  - 0.451  0.074  *** -  0.524  0.080  *** -  0.616  0.069  *** 
Number of children    5.529  0.800  ***    6.000  1.059  ***    6.603  0.744  *** 
(Number of children)
2  - 1.033  0.198  *** -  1.148  0.198  *** -  1.053  0.184  *** 
t × δ             -  0.696  0.045  *** 
( ) s t × δ               -  0.604  0.091  *** 
()
2 s t × δ                 0.013  0.003  *** 
t × − ) 1 ( δ             -  0.517  0.051  *** 
2 ) 1 ( t × − δ             -  0.003  0.001  *** 
w / 1   - 25.81  1.161  *** -  24.49  1.487  *** -  17.68  1.112  *** 
w I F /
~
) 1 ( × − δ     0.310  0.011  ***    0.206  0.014  ***    0.180  0.011  *** 
w / 1 × δ     406.1  206.8  **    372.1  301.7  NS    472.6  199.7  ** 
δ     51.81  1.855  ***    35.07  2.991  ***    32.99  2.078  *** 
w ws/ × δ     2.769  0.214  ***    3.136  1.235  **    0.959  0.245  *** 
w y/ × δ      0.192  0.012  ***    0.235  0.020  ***    0.177  0.011  *** 
w ys/ × δ       0.050  0.008  ***    0.047  0.008  ***    0.035  0.007  *** 
× δ Birth year / w   - 0.200  0.105  * -  0.183  0.151  NS -  0.246  0.101  ** 
× δ Mar. with ch. / w     11.30  4.605  **    8.439  5.937  NS    13.33  4.286  *** 
× δ Mar. without ch. / w   - 8.736  3.716  ** -  15.48  5.471  *** -  7.484  3.472  ** 
× δ Cohab. with ch. / w     17.67  4.532  ***    17.40  5.352  ***    5.882  4.223  NS 
× δ Age youngest ch. / w  - 1.713  0.260  *** -  1.640  0.390  *** -  1.660  0.242  *** 
× δ Children / w  - 13.95  3.770  *** -  14.08  3.834  *** -  11.05  3.536  *** 
× δ (Children)
2/ w    2.277  0.847  ***    2.376  0.844  ***    0.922  0.793  NS 
× δ Trend / w    0.628  0.231  ***    0.393  0.430  NS    0.923  0.217  *** 
× δ w t /                  0.603  0.146  *** 
× δ w t s /                1.204  0.329  *** 
× δ w t / 2             -  0.015  0.002  *** 
× δ () w ts /
2
            -  0.032  0.009  *** 
× δ w PUBEXP/   - 0.478  0.010  *** -  0.543  0.290  * -  0.046  0.032  NS 
wave 2    0.415  0.510  NS -  0.253  0.547  NS    0.712  0.474  NS 
wave 3    0.274  0.468  NS -  0.253  0.465  NS    0.584  0.436  NS 
wave 4    0.207  0.428  NS -  0.432  0.516  NS    0.496  0.398  NS 
wave 5    0.362  0.397  NS -  0.044  0.456  NS    0.544  0.368  NS 
wave 6    0.570  0.364  NS    0.243  0.416  NS    0.549  0.338  NS 
wave 7    0.894  0.326  ***    0.629  0.345  *    0.923  0.302  *** 
wave 8    0.782  0.304  **    0.387  0.316  NS    0.784  0.281  *** 
wave 9    0.503  0.261  *    0.338  0.265  NS    0.468  0.241  * 
Observations  17734     17343     17734     
Overall R2  0.1541     0.1751     0.1280        24
Table 4: preference Parameters 
 
 
 Model  1  Std   Model  2  Std   Model  3  Std   
Subsistence Level of Consumption (£91/week)             
γ  - (constant)    83.11  3.81  ***    119.1  10.3  *** 98.45  5.28  *** 
Subsistence Level of Leisure (hours / week)             
constant   125.97  4.56  ***    133.0  8.21  *** 139.3  110  *** 
married with child    3.739  2.09  *    3.916  3.97  NS 1.015  1.36  NS 
married without child    2.286  1.62  NS    3.646  2.49  NS 1.094  1.20  NS 
cohabiting with child  - 2.572  1.76  NS -  2.621  2.74  NS 1.839  1.26  NS 
age of youngest child  - 0.654  0.01  *** -  0.659  0.01  *** -  0.751  0.08  *** 
number of children    8.020  0.93  ***    7.552  1.37  *** 8.049  0.91  *** 
(number of children)
2 -  1.498  0.06  *** -  1.445  0.04  *** -  1.283  0.22  *** 
t × δ             -  0.849  0.05  *** 
s t × δ             -  0.737  0.11  *** 
()
2 s t × δ                0.016  0.003  *** 
t × − ) 1 ( δ             -  0.631  0.061  *** 
2 ) 1 ( t × − δ             -  0.004  0.001  *** 
 
 
Table 5: Sharing Rule 
 
 
 Model  1  Std   Model  2  Std   Model  3  Std   
Constant 1307.7  664.5  ** 1810.2  1508.3  NS 2631.1  1111.2  ** 
w  166.81  2.820  *** 170.58  16.87  *** 183.69  6.362  *** 
s w   8.915  0.752  *** 15.258  6.577  ** 5.337  1.405  *** 
y   0.617  0.043  *** 1.144  0.146  *** 0.988  0.084  *** 
s y   0.161  0.026  *** 0.228  0.045  *** 0.193  0.042  *** 
Year of birth  - 0.643  0.337  * -  0.892  0.757  NS -  1.369  0.563  ** 
Married with child  36.40  14.91  ** 41.054  28.20  NS 74.198  24.44  *** 
Married without child  - 28.13  11.98  ** -75.290  28.79  *** -  41.668 19.46  ** 
Cohabiting with child  56.88  14.71  *** 84.645  28.17  *** 32.750  23.51  NS 
Age of youngest child  - 5.515  0.857  *** -  7.979  2.157  *** -  9.244  1.441  *** 
Number of children  - 44.93  12.26  *** -  68.515  18.79  *** -  61.544 20.16  *** 
(Number of children)
2 7.333  2.743  *** 11.558  4.257  *** 5.133  4.432  NS 
Trend 2.023  0.741  *** 1.911  2.034  NS 5.140  1.220  *** 
PUBEXP   - 1.538  0.062  *** -  2.644  1.507  * -  0.257  0.181  NS 
t            3.360  0.842  *** 
S t             6.702  1.870  *** 
2 t             -  0.083  0.013  *** 
()
2 s t             -  0.177  0.052  *** 
    25
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Table 6: Average Sharing Rule obtained by the woman (Restricted Sample) 
 
 
 Model  1  Std  Model 2  Std  Model 3  Std 
Consumption and Leisure Expenditures 
(in £91/week)  
•  Without domestic good 

























Ratio of Household Private Expenditures 
•  Without domestic good 


























Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
SINGLE      
- wage  13.5 (8.14)  15.2 (8.93)  15.9 (6.54) 
- time spent to housework  - 2.65 (0.74)  - 3.09 (1.03)  - 0.83 (0.46) 
COUPLE      
- wage  8.66 (10.2)  - 0.99 (19.8)  39.0 (7.16) 
- partner’s wage  0.25 (5.67)  0.69 (10.7)  3.59 (1.01) 
- time spent to housework (t)  - 4.06 (1.23)  - 8.16 (2.93)  23.0 (28.1) 
- time partner spend to housework (t
s)  - 4.91 (2.00)  - 9.70 (3.99)  4.53 (2.10)    26
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